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Military analysts believe this could impair
the effective combat use of Russia's strategic
nuclear arms. A meeting among the defence ministers
of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) that began in
Brussels on June 8 plans to devote its energies
precisely to this issue.
Yet this sufficiently complicated debate cannot
be resolved quickly. The United States continues
to assert its commitment to the joint development
of missile-defence systems with Russia, but refuses
to give legally sealed guarantees that such systems
will not be directed against its potential collaborator.
Russia and the United States continue to negotiate
in a mood of mutual distrust. Moscow fears that
its strategic nuclear forces will be weakened.
Washington and its European partners prefer to
rely solely on their own armed forces under Article
5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
It is possible to escape the current impasse
if the following measures are implemented in the
near future.
Meeting halfway
First of all, a joint center for the exchange
of data from early-warning systems should be opened
in Moscow under the May 2002 Joint Declaration
on a New Relationship between the United States
and Russia.
The online center should function as the first
early-warning link between the United States/NATO
and Russia. Additional centers could be opened
in the United States and Europe.
Second, Russia, the United States, and NATO should
continue to hold joint computerized exercises
on theater-level missile-defence systems. Substantial
positive experience has already been accumulated
in this field.
Prominent military analyst Vladimir Dvorkin says
that five Russian-U.S. computerized exercises
in this sphere were conducted between 1996 and
2006. Four more exercises involving Russia, the
United States, and NATO were held between 2003
and 2008 in Colorado, the Netherlands, Moscow,
and Munich.
Third, Russia and the United States should consider
the possibility of holding a joint exercise to
intercept a high-speed ballistic target. The exercise
should involve Russia's S-300 PMU-1/SA-20A Gargoyle
and S-400 Triumf/SA-21 Growler surface-to-air
missiles, as well as the U.S. Army Patriot PAC-2
missiles. The exercise could take place, for instance,
at the Ashuluk firing range in Russia's Astrakhan
Region.
Although this is not enough to facilitate more
partner-like Russian-U.S. relations in the sphere
of missile defense, the implementation of such
measures would promote mutual trust and also make
it possible to discuss the crucial issue of the
interoperability of national missile-defence systems.
It is clear that the United States will be unable
to delay the creation of a European missile-defense
system due to domestic policy considerations and
its previous obligations to NATO.
This is intensified by the fact that Iran rapidly
continues to increase its missile potential and
has voiced an ominously vague stance on the true
objectives of its national nuclear program. Iranian
specialists are currently developing the two-stage
solid-propellant Sajil missile with a maximum
range of 2,200 kilometers. The missile carries
a warhead weighing one metric ton and can also
be fitted with a 500-kg warhead, increasing its
range to 3,000 km.
Missiles of this type may present a threat to
southern Russia, including the Volgograd Region
and some European states. Iran may be capable
of using such missiles as early as two to three
years from now. Consequently, the creation of
a joint missile-defence system in the foreseeable
future reflects common Russian-NATO interests.
The interoperability of the system's elements
is just the first step in this direction.
Adding to the incentives for such cooperation
are the convenient locations of Russian radar
systems in Gabala, Azerbaijan, and near Armavir
in the North Caucasus.
In 2009, the administration of U.S. President
Barack Obama renounced the creation of a space-based
missile-defence system and limited ground-based
missile-defence systems to 30 ground-based interceptors
in California and Alaska. The system also has
eight reserve GBIs.
The United States plans to deploy ten SM-3 Block
2B ground-based missile interceptors in Poland
by 2018 in order to intercept intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
Moreover, the United States has launched the
serial production of SM-1 interceptors and plans
to deploy six ground batteries of the Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system,
as well as the 24 SM-3 Block 2A missiles of the
ground-based Aegis Ashore system, in Romania.
All these missiles are designed to intercept short-range
and medium-range ballistic missiles.
Russia wields the A-135 ballistic missile-defence
system around Moscow. This system makes it possible
to neutralize a limited nuclear strike during
its final approach, yet it is virtually impossible
to include in a joint missile-defence system.
The operational S-400 missiles with a maximum
intercept altitude of not more than 30 km and
the more advanced S-500 missiles, whose specifications
will hardly exceed those of the THAAD system,
are unable to hit high targets. All this seriously
limits Russia's potential for joining the European
missile-defence system.
The southern front
Russia's dilemma could be solved by placing missile-defence
units in the Southern Federal District. It would
thus become possible to create a regional European
missile-defense system, as proposed by President
Dmitry Medvedev at the November 2010 Russia-NATO
summit in Lisbon.
Considering possible launch trajectories from
an Iranian missile base near Isfahan, it would
be most appropriate to deploy Russian missile
interceptors near Rostov-on-Don and guide them
to their targets with the help of cutting-edge
radar near Armavir, thus shielding Russia from
medium-range Iranian missiles.
Russia's scientific and production potential
makes it possible to promptly design and deploy
missile interceptors with a 200-300 km intercept
altitude and conventional warheads for dealing
kinetic strikes in the case of direct hits or
fragmentary strikes in order to destroy ballistic
targets.
Such missile interceptors should obviously be
deployed on mobile launchers, and their initial
number should be limited to 16 - the size of a
standard air-defence missile brigade.
In this sense, however, it is possible to establish
a joint Russian-European missile-defence system
only in an as yet indefinite future.
In order to do so, Russia, the United States,
and Washington's European allies first have to
improve their mutual trust. This can be accomplished
through data exchanges and joint exercises. If
Moscow deploys missile-defence units in southern
Russia, then it will become necessary to facilitate
the interoperability of the new Russian system
and a similar system in Romania, to say the least.
In effect, this will become the first step on
the road to creating a joint European missile-defence
system. (RIA Novosti)
Director of the Center
for Social and Political Studies, Moscow (for
RIA Novosti)
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