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Russia has not even managed to hold onto the
position held by the Soviet Union in terms of
the number of surface ships and their combat potential
(add to that the fact that back then the Soviet
Navy was objectively weaker than the American
Navy already). The submarine fleet was handed
a dubious legacy from the Soviet Union. But the
submarine forces, although hit hard after the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, have managed
to retain far greater potential for recovery than
the surface fleet.
Military submarines, which officially became
part of the Russian Navy back in March 1906, have
become the backbone of the Navy and are now its
chief asymmetric weapon.
Delfin and others
A lot of time has elapsed since March 1906 when
by Nicholas II’s resolution, which subsequently
became a Marine Department order, the Russian
Imperial Navy acquired a submarine fleet.
Yet the first submarine, called the Delfin, had
joined the Baltic Fleet even earlier – in
1904. Since the category of submarine combat vessel
did not exist, the Delfin was initially listed
as a torpedo boat.
The Delfin and a number of other boats were even
sent by rail to Vladivostok, where they were deployed
on a number of sea missions during the Russo-Japanese
war of 1905.
The role of submarines has been steadily rising
ever since, despite the sporadic attempts at building
up the surface fleet. The glory days of the “silent
service” were the latter stages of the Soviet
Union, during the 1970s and 1980s.
A fleet swimming against
the tide
The country’s surface ships in fact had
very limited combat exposure during World War
II and what experience they did have was far from
successful, if you take into account the Tallinn
crossing of 1941 and the Black Sea tragedy of
1942.
The few successes scored by surface ships could
not hide the fact that even if the “quiet
service” was no more successful than the
rest of the Navy, at least it looked more like
a regular balanced unit. On the Baltic Sea, underwater
warfare went on for years, while on the Black
Sea the surface fleet received several painful
hits from the German air force and did not display
much activity. It was only on the Northern Fleet
that the daring torpedo boats sailed to the west
to meet the polar convoys.
The submarine force operated in parallel: going
on sea missions and duty patrols, engaging in
communication sessions, trying to break through
anti-submarine defenses, and returning home.
When the war ended, instead of getting better
the situation for the Navy in fact deteriorated
further. Not only were NATO forces superior to
the Soviet Navy, but NATO’s shipbuilding
capacity was head and shoulders above that of
the Soviet shipyards (and this is without even
counting the inevitable falling behind in technology).
Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the father of the Soviet
ocean fleet (who was in office from 1956 to 1985),
promoted the concept of an “anti-carrier
force”: the main attack core of the Soviet
Navy was to neutralize the main fighting core
of NATO’s naval force – its aircraft
carrier groups.
In the triad of anti-carrier forces (surface,
underwater and airborne) the submarines took pride
of place. The nuclear anti-ship submarines became
the main strike force at sea. Surface carriers
armed with heavy anti-ship missiles were less
combat capable than their underwater cousins,
while naval missile-carrying aircraft were not
strictly speaking a means of gaining control of
the seas.
The 1960s saw the start of the race between the
“city busters”: the Soviet Navy began
competing with the American fleet for domination
of naval strategic nuclear forces. Missile-carrying
submarines on patrol duty cruised around the target
areas, waiting for the command to strike. They
were closely stalked by enemy boats tasked with
thwarting their mission.
Duels over the bottomless depths occasionally
ended in clashes.
On March 20, 1992, the K-407 missile-carrying
submarine collided with the U.S. submarine Grayling,
which had been eavesdropping on its Soviet counterpart.
Earlier, in May 1981, the K-211 missile-carrying
submarine had also had a brush with an unidentified
boat while returning to base. On February 11,
1992, the Russian Project 945 hunter-killer submarine
(believed to be the K-239) when trying to surface
collided with the U.S. submarine Baton Rouge,
which had been spying on it, and had lost its
trail.
Unable to challenge the U.S. surface ships to
any meaningful extent, the Soviet Navy was forced
to move underwater. This is not strictly speaking
true, since heavy missile-carrying cruisers and
large anti-submarine ships regularly plied the
oceans. But the emphasis shifted: with the surface
force falling behind, the nuclear submarines started
assuming an increasingly important role.
In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union managed
to get past the tight system of export control
and succeeded in importing milling machines capable
of producing submarine propellers with a much
better surface quality, which helped the main
defect of Soviet submarines – their high
noise level – to be overcome.
The next generation of submarines was also on
its way. Some of the plans for them are currently
being implemented: the frequently redesigned Project
955 Borei class submarine and the Project 885
multi-purpose Yasen-class submarine.
Into the 21st century
Submarines today are still the asymmetric weapon
of the Russian Navy, almost to an even greater
degree than before 1991. The massive collapse
of Russia’s presence in the world’s
oceans has led to the mass decommissioning of
warships.
The boats suffered too, and quantitatively perhaps
even more so, but the active surface force is
now so diminished that the role of the submarines
can only keep growing. In the long run, it is
they who will bear the main burden of combat service.
Venturing out into the oceans is now decidedly
difficult: despite cutbacks, the U.S. Navy is
still capable of squeezing out anyone who encroaches
on Washington’s naval might. Competing with
the United States in terms of the number of nuclear
anti-aircraft carriers escorted by missile-carrying
cruisers is impossible. It is equally impossible
to compete in operations in remote theaters: both
in terms of provision of ships and overseas bases.
But that is on the surface. Underwater, Russia’s
chances are different, although still not that
bright. Below the surface Russian submariners
are perfectly capable of putting up a fight against
any potential opponents. The equipment available
to them (and that under development) makes the
outcome of underwater warfare far less predictable
than on the surface.
Russia may not have the money to build a large
ocean-going fleet. That is the historical fate
of Russian shipbuilding: it is too weak to manufacture
ships on a commercial, batch-produced basis. Its
bases and repair facilities are equally under
strength – the Soviet and Russian navies
have both had to deal with the same kinds of problems
for 100 to 150 years.
As for the submarines, they have been with us
since the Russian Empire, maintaining Russia’s
naval tradition by being the backbone of the Navy.
They are likely to remain so for a long time –
if not forever.
(RIA Novosti)
(The author is RIA Novosti military affairs columnist
)
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