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Even though 50,000 to 60,000 nuclear warheads
were produced since the arguably senseless bombing
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, some basic
human survival instinct “repeatedly stayed the
finger that might have pushed the button.” The
world’s abhorrence for nuclear weapons is now
so widespread and deep-rooted that even if battlefield
or tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) were to be
used against a purely military target in a conflict
in future, the effect would be strategic. In fact,
the impact would be geo-strategic as the explosion
of even a single nuclear weapon anywhere on earth
would be one too many. The employment of nuclear
weapons as useful weapons of war was always doubtful;
it is even more questionable today. Given the
widespread abhorrence of nuclear weapons, the
Nuclear Rubicon cannot be lightly crossed now
and whichever nation decides to cross it will
have to bear the consequences.
According to William R. Van Cleave and S. T.
Cohen, “… the term tactical nuclear weapons in
the closest approximation refers to battlefield
nuclear weapons, for battlefield use, and with
deployment ranges and yields consistent with such
use and confined essentially in each respect to
the area of localised military operations.” Some
air-dropped nuclear glide bombs, carried by fighter-bombers,
have been known to have yields of over one megaton.
Parts of NATO’s erstwhile TNW forces, including
Pershing missiles, were on constant readiness
alert as part of the Quick Reaction Alert force.
The line dividing tactical (including theatre)
and strategic nuclear weapons is rather blurred.
While a strategic strike can be conducted with
weapons of low yield, a tactical strike can be
effected with virtually any class of nuclear weapons
– though the results achieved may not be commensurate
with the effort put in. For example, hitting a
forward military airfield with an ICBM would be
a gross overkill and would result in extremely
high collateral damage. In fact, the phrase ‘tactical
use of nuclear weapons’ would convey a more accurate
sense of the intended use rather than ‘use of
tactical nuclear weapons’.
In the public perception, the most popular TNWs
have been the 8 inch (203 mm) M-110 and the 155
mm M-109 atomic artillery weapons, and the Lance
and Honest John SRBMs. At the upper end of the
range scale were the Pershing missiles with a
range of 160 to 835 km. These were intermediate
range theatre SRBMs. The erstwhile Soviet and
Warsaw Pact forces had their own corresponding
TNWs. Among the better known ones were the FROG
and Scud series of rockets and missiles. In addition,
there was a category of weapons known as ‘mini-nukes’.
These had yields from 0.05 to 0.5 kilotons. TNWs,
particularly those of the US and its NATO allies,
were nuclear warfighting weapons and formed an
important part of NATO’s strategy of flexible
response or ‘first use’ policy. These weapons
were among the first that would have been used
in the early stages of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.
During the Cold War, the proponents of TNWs justified
their requirement on the following grounds: they
deter the use of TNWs by the enemy; they provide
flexible response over the whole range of possible
military threats; they offer nuclear military
options below the strategic level; they help to
defeat large-scale conventional attacks; and,
they serve the political purpose of demonstrating
commitment to the allies. The opponents of TNWs
asserted that these ‘more usable’ weapons would
lower the nuclear threshold and make nuclear use
more likely. Fears of collateral damage in the
extensively populated and developed NATO heartland
spurred European opposition to TNWs. Many European
political and military leaders convincingly argued
that NATO would be better off without TNWs. Alain
Enthoven wrote: “Tactical nuclear weapons cannot
defend Western Europe; they can only destroy it…
there is no such thing as tactical nuclear war
in the sense of sustained, purposive military
operations…”
There are other compelling reasons too for leaving
TNWs out of the nuclear arsenal. Firstly, these
are extremely complex weapons (particularly sub-kiloton
mini-nukes, because of the precision required
in engineering) and are difficult and expensive
to manufacture and support technically. Inducting
them into service even in small numbers would
considerably raise the budget of the strategic
forces. Secondly, the command and control of TNWs
needs to be decentralised at some point during
war to enable their timely employment. Extremely
tight control would make their possession redundant
and degrade their deterrence value. Decentralised
control would run the risk of their premature
and even unauthorised use – Kissinger’s ‘mad major
syndrome’. Thirdly, since the launchers must move
frequently to avoid being targeted, dispersed
storage and frequent transportation of TNWs under
field conditions, increases the risk of accidents.
Lastly, the employment of conventional artillery
and air-to-ground precision weapons by the enemy
may damage or destroy stored nuclear warheads.
India has correctly opted not to go down the
TNW route, but Pakistan has chosen to acquire
these dangerous weapons. According to Pakistani
analysts, the Htf-9 (Nasr) missile is their answer
to India’s Cold Start doctrine as the use of TNWs
will stop India’s armoured spearheads advancing
into Pakistan in their tracks. They miss the centrality
of India’s no first use doctrine completely: even
one nuclear strike – whether in India or against
Indian forces – will invite ‘massive punitive
retaliation’, which Pakistan can ill afford.
It is now universally accepted that nuclear weapons
are political weapons and are not weapons of ‘warfighting’.
By extension, TNWs now have no role to play in
combat. The international community must come
together to stop Pakistan’s dangerous quest to
acquire these destabilising weapons.
(The author is a Delhi-based
defence analyst.)
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