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However, for those of you whose mental picture
of ‘maritime security’ evokes images
of warships and submarines, a lot has happened
in the recent past to draw comfort from. The nuclear
reactor of India’s first ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) went critical on August 9, 2013
in Vishakhapatnam, to be followed, three days
later, by the launch of the indigenous aircraft-carrier
in Kochi. Earlier, in 2012, a Russian nuclear-powered
attack submarine had been inducted on a 10-year
lease. Over the next decade, the Indian Navy (IN)
expects delivery of; seven stealth frigates, six
diesel submarines, and 30 other warships, apart
from over 150 fighters, maritime-patrol aircraft
and helicopters. And even as I speak, our brand-new
aircraft-carrier INS Vikramaditya is preparing
to sail from Russia on her homeward-bound voyage.
All these acquisitions will cost the exchequer
in the region of about $25-30 billion, and we
must note two important aspects in this context.
Firstly, there are not many navies, world-wide,
which have seen, in recent years, or are likely
to see; in the midst of a global economic downturn,
such significant accretions to their order-of-battle.
Secondly, this force build-up, once complete,
will not only enhance the Navy’s combat capability
by an order of magnitude, but would also alter
the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region,
provided necessary strategic guidance is forthcoming
from government.
THE ROOTS OF INDIA’S
MARITIME GROWTH
Although India’s ancient maritime tradition
pre-dates Greek, Roman and Carthaginian exploits
in the Mediterranean, not enough is known about
it, because we had neither a Herodotus nor Thucydides
to record history; and our past suffers from a
lack of documentation.
A lone Indian voice in this historiographic
void is that of Sardar KM Panikkar; statesman,
diplomat and visionary. According to Panikkar,
due to its earlier civilisation and its predictable
system of monsoon winds, it was the Indian Ocean
region, and not the Mediterranean or Aegean Seas,
which saw the world’s first oceanic sailing
activity.
THE PURPOSE OF SEA POWER
American strategist Admiral Mahan, writing in
1902, said: “War has ceased to be the natural,
or even normal, condition of nations, and military
considerations are subordinate to the other great
interests they serve; economics and commerce.”
In our own context, the dramatic growth of India’s
economy has been stimulated by the powerful phenomenon
of globalisation; leading to not just large foreign
direct investment in India, but also heavy Indian
investment abroad. Thus, along with an Indian
Diaspora of over 20 million, we also have growing
economic interests world-wide. India’s economy
as well as progress and prosperity depend on international
trade, which is carried overwhelmingly by sea;
as is energy, the lifeblood of our industry. These
factors, coupled with the prospects of harvesting
oceanic resources and India’s growing international
profile, have helped awaken an overdue realisation
of our dependence on the seas.
We need to be quite clear that contrary to popular
perception, a country’s maritime strength
does not reside, exclusively, in its navy; which
is merely one of a number of components that complement
each other in contributing to maritime security.
In fact, by creating an expensive navy and neglecting
the other constituents of maritime power we are
indulging in self-delusion. There is an urgent
need to focus on the other aspects, many of them
belonging to the civil sector, that are needed
to make India a complete maritime nation.
THE MISSING INDUSTRIAL
UNDERPINNING
It is a quirk of fate that India has become
a significant military and economic entity, with
great-power aspirations, before it has become
a significant industrial power or even a major
trading nation. Thus, India finds itself in an
anomalous situation wherein it possess nuclear
weapons and boasts of the world’s 5th or
6th largest armed forces, but is forced to support
their operational requirements through massive
imports. The nonchalance with which we continue
to import huge quantities of defence hardware
not only undermines our security but renders all
talk of ‘strategic autonomy’ quite meaningless.
In a related context, it is preposterous and
irrational that while the MoD has no qualms about
importing billions of dollars worth of weapons
from abroad, it should strongly resist any suggestion
about private Indian companies entering the defence
sector. This single measure has deprived the navy
of the support that a capable private sector industrial
base that could have provided, in peace and in
war. Consequently, the navy’s operational
readiness remains hostage, on one hand to the
inefficient and complacent public sector, and
on the other, to unreliable foreign suppliers.
THE CIVIL MARITIME DOMAIN
Considering that 97 per cent of our trade is
carried by sea, the civil maritime sector, defined
by the Ministry of Surface Transport as encompassing
port operations, the merchant fleet, the shipbuilding
industry and trained human resources, is a vital
component of maritime security.
Three major aspects of the civil maritime sector
addressed by these perspective plans are ports,
the shipping industry and shipbuilding. Since
all of them impinge either directly or indirectly,
on maritime security I will touch upon them briefly.
PORTS AND HARBOURS
To a mariner, India’s 13 major and 176
minor ports present a distressing prospect. Badly
congested, poorly managed and lacking in facilities
for dredging, mechanisation and storage, they
are grossly inadequate to meet the cargo-throughput
requirements of our growing economy.
SHIPPING INDUSTRY
A nation’s merchant fleet is yet another
strategic asset, and now crude-oil and natural-gas
carriers and container ships are almost as important
as warships in the secur India’s merchant
fleet, 15th largest in the world, has been almost
static, for some years, at 1000 ships totalling
10 million tonnes. This fleet can carry less than
10 per cent of our foreign trade, and is not only
woefully inadequate for India’s needs, but
also lacks container, product and specialised
carriers. Considering the fact that the Indian
seaborne trade is set to double or triple by 2020,
the Indian shipping tonnage needs to be speedily
augmented in order to arrest further decline in
the share of Indian ships.
SHIPBUILDING
While the basic driver of shipbuilding is global
seaborne trade, it is a strategic industry which
an emerging power like India has been gravely
remiss in not nurturing. Of all the Indian flagged
merchant vessels, just over 10 per cent have been
built in Indian shipyards; because of higher costs,
lengthy delivery periods and, sometimes, due to
indifferent quality.
Indian shipyards contribute just 1 per cent
of the global market share. The target of achieving
5 per cent share of global shipbuilding in next
seven years set by the Maritime Agenda-2020 is
quite unrealistic, because even a marginal increase
capacity will call for a herculean effort.
WHAT AILS THE DEFENCE
SHIPYARDS?
No nation has ever become a maritime power by
importing naval hardware from abroad, and competent
warship building shipyards are the sine qua non
for achieving ascendancy at sea. In their long-term
vision of creating a competent maritime force,
India’s naval leadership has remained steadfast
in their resolve to have it built in Indian shipyards;
even in the face of acute scepticism. Regrettably,
this commitment to indigenisation has not been
reciprocated by the industry with equal passion.
The real cause for serious concern relates to
the tendency which makes us declare that a newly
delivered warship is, for example, ‘75 to
80 per cent indigenous’. While some may consider
this an acceptable piece of public-relations hyperbole,
such statements actually cause grave harm because
they lull us into complacency. The truth of the
matter is that the propulsion, weapons, sensors,
electronics and many other systems that go into
every warship, that we build indigenously, are
either imported or assembled in India under licence.
Therefore the chances are that the ship may actually
be 75 to 80 per cent imported by value!
MARITIME CHALLENGES
India’s main strategic challenge comes
from its prosperous northern neighbour; China.
Without entering into a detailed discussion about
respective capabilities and intentions, it can
be said that China and India, are going to make
uneasy neighbours. For the two nuclear-armed nations
to rise, almost simultaneously, without conflict
will require either adroit diplomacy or a miracle;
possibly both. The all weather Sino-Pakistan alliance,
with its strong anti-Indian slant, further complicates
our security problems.
Within the Sino-Indian strategic equation, the
maritime dimension is a relatively new factor.
The rapid growth of both economies has led to
increasing reliance on energy and raw materials,
which are transported by sea. This has focused
sharp attention on the criticality, for both economies,
of uninterrupted use of the sea-lanes for trade
and energy transportation. Thus, while the PLA
Navy makes forays into the Indian Ocean, the IN
has newfound commitments in the South China Sea.
The navy’s biggest challenge is going to
be the timely replacement of ageing platforms
and obsolescent equipment. The envisaged order
of battle of about 150-170 ships and submarines,
and possibly 250-300 aircraft assumes certain
delivery rates from shipyards and aircraft factories;
which they seem incapable of meeting. At the same
time, our other major source, of hardware, the
Russians, have brazenly reneged on costs as well
as delivery schedules, in violation of solemn
agreements. One of the more serious challenges
before the navy’s leadership will be to persuade
the Russians as well as Indian DPSUs to deliver
on time and within cost.
The failure to acquire even a reasonable level
of self-reliance in major weapon systems in the
past 66 years has made India the biggest importer
of arms world-wide; and this must count as a failure
of the DRDO and DPSUs. Crafting a viable and time-bound
strategy which will persuade the DRDO to develop,
reverse-engineer or import the technology for
weapons and sensors for our indigenously built
warships will constitute another major challenge
for the IN.
China’s pursuit of a, so called, ‘string
of pearls’ strategy tends to draw considerable
attention in strategic circles due to its high-profile
economic connotations. While India may not be
able to match China’s financial munificence,
the navy’s ‘foreign cooperation’
initiatives have ensured creation of a favourable
maritime environment in the region. Apart from
activities such as exercises, joint-patrolling,
port calls and flag-showing deployments, the navy’s
out-reach also includes provision of maritime
security on request by neighbours.
MARITIME GAME-CHANGERS
Intense maritime activity in the Indian Ocean
and the huge area that has to be kept under surveillance
requires substantial reconnaissance and anti-submarine
capabilities. The expected advent of the PLA Navy,
especially its nuclear submarines, into the Indian
Ocean will lend urgency to the maritime domain
awareness (MDA) task. The IN has evolved a multi
layered surveillance capability with deployment
of task-optimised aircraft, as well as unmanned
aerial vehicles for each layer. The ‘icing
on the cake’ is the recently launched GSAT-7
communication satellite, meant exclusively for
IN use, which will facilitate the networking of
sensor and weapon data across its vast footprint.
The arrival of INS Vikramaditya, with its complement
of MiG-29K fighters and Kamov-28/31 helicopters,
will boost the navy’s capability to exercise
sea-control and to project power over the shore.
Current plans envisage a second (and perhaps third)
indigenously-built carrier joining the fleet in
the 10-15 years. Given the wealth of carrier operating
experience available in the IN, these ships are
capable of tilting the balance of power in our
region.
Operationalisation of the SSBN ‘Arihant’
will ensure that India has an invulnerable 2nd
strike capability; thus enhancing the effectiveness
and credibility of its nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis
adversaries; China and Pakistan. As the Service
responsible for safe and efficient conduct of
SSBN operations, the IN will also be the custodian
of their nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, thus
enhancing its status and importance in the national
security totem-pole.
The induction of the nuclear-powered attack-submarine
(SSN) INS Chakra has placed a powerful weapon
of offence and sea-denial in the hands of the
IN. Unlike warships which remain vulnerable to
detection and attack from all three dimensions,
a SSN on patrol vanishes from sight; to reappear
as the deadly nemesis of ships and submarines.
Apart from the anti-shipping role it can also
undertake, with virtual impunity, tasks as varied
as surveillance, special-operations, intelligence-gathering
and land-attack.
CONCLUSION
A strong and balanced navy is vital for India’s
march towards major power status. Such a force
will soon be a reality; largely through the navy’s
foresight and indigenous efforts. However, it
is necessary for the decision-makers to understand
that the navy, by itself, constitutes just one
pillar of the country’s maritime capability,
and without the rest of the structure, including
strategic guidance, to complement and provide
support, the edifice of naval power will indeed
remain hollow and vulnerable.
- Courtesy: IDSA
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