ADMIRAL Sergei Gorshkov became chief of the erstwhile Soviet Navy at the age of 45; he then remained in that chair for nearly 18 years. During his period in this high office, that Navy grew into a powerful sea-going force and it was during his tenure that the Soviets, until then derisively opposed to aircraft carriers considering them vulnerable to shore-based air and missile attacks, did a turnround and began to build these ships.

One of them, commissioned after his death, was to bear his name. This is the story of the Russian aircraft carrier, Gorshkov, currently in the news because it is being acquired by India.

In his recent report the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has made scathing remarks about its cost and condition.

The vessel, sold free but contracted at a cost of Rs 974 crore for its refit and modernisation (it had been lying unused for several years after the collapse of the Soviet economy), has suffered time and cost overruns, both due to underestimation of work and modifications needed by the Indian side.

The revised demand for $2.9 billion may finally be settled for around $2 billion but the CAG finds this a gross overspend for a platform which, in his view, would last only 20 years when a new one could be built at the same cost to last 40 years. In short, the country has been taken for a ride is the conclusion.

All those who have served in the Navy in earlier years know that no one has been more supportive of the growth of the Indian Navy as a premier maritime force in this part of the world than Admiral Gorshkov.

The Indians never asked for missile boats but were persuaded by him to buy them in 1968 with results that were seen worldwide in the spectacular attacks on Karachi in December 1971.

Later, in 1975, he pressed his own bureaucracy to clear the sale of the larger and more potent missile corvettes of the Vijaydurg class and the versatile missile destroyers of the Rajput class which made the Indian Navy comparable with any other naval force, leave aside that of the USA.

In 1988, a nuclear submarine was leased to us for three years, an act unimaginable from any of the other countries which operated such craft. The interface set in place by him has, happily, continued resulting in design collaboration for the Delhi class destroyers built in India and the sale of Tabar class frigates, all of technology relevant to modern warfare at sea.

The latest manifestation of this close relationship has seen the launch of our indigenous nuclear submarine INS Arihant in Visakhapatnam. This is the background in which we need to look at the acquisition of Gorshkov.

Let us look at the comments in perspective, first exploitability. In 1987, we acquired a much older aircraft carrier, HMS Hermes, from the British and renamed it INS Viraat. It has already been in service for 22 years and will last another 7 or 8 years, a life span of 30 years.

The first aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, also purchased second hand in 1961, saw service until 1997, a good 36 years.

So this rather pessimistic assessment of a two decade life span for Gorshkov, much newer than the other two, by the CAG is clearly unjustified. There is no reason why this ship should not be operational for at least 30 years, possibly more.

Aircraft carriers are versatile hulls; in both the US and UK navies, which have great experience of operating such platforms, these vessels have routinely served for five decades. So the life time of Gorshkov is not an issue.

Then, there is the question of cost of repairs, which is said to have escalated to $ 2 billion. When the contract was concluded, repair work was just an estimate. It is only when the plates are ripped open and assemblies and sub-assemblies dismantled that a more accurate assessment of work can be made.

The state of cables, a very important constituent of equipment functionality, is not known until the innards are revealed. Then, there is the question of additional work required by the buyer to install new equipment and facilities.

In the case of Gorshkov, a huge ski jump of 400 tonnes of steel, 200 feet long and stretched 120 feet across the deck is being constructed for launch of aircraft.

In all such repairs carried out in Indian dockyards, work of much less scope and in smaller ships has taken far longer than earlier estimated but because the expenses are part of the dockyards' operating budget, no precise estimate of such refit costs has ever been made.

Accurate cost accounting would reveal they have been much higher than originally thought. So, we have to look at the increased refit costs now being projected with a little more pragmatism.

Finally, the contention that this ship is going to cost as much as a new one is not founded on facts. The indigenous aircraft carrier now being built at Kochi was ordered in 1997 but will not be launched until 2011 at the earliest. It will be at least 2016 before it enters operational service. Its cost, on delivery, will be nearly double that being paid for the Russian ship.

When the Navy Chief said recently that for $ 2 billion he would sign a cheque for the Gorshkov any day, he was not being flippant but clear sighted. The Indian Navy is not in the business of buying or negotiating for junk; its professional competence deserves greater credit than has been given. It is true that the delivery of the ship has been delayed a few years till 2012 due to extra work and price finalisation but this is not unusual in such complex projects.

Aircraft carriers are no ordinary warships, nor are they available off the shelf from wherever one chooses. They represent strategic sea power and provide to India a capability that no other regional nation has. We should not treat them as ordinary ammunition or ordnance.

Further, such acquisitions are to be seen in a larger context of inter-nation relationship and not as 'one off' purchases. There is a cost to everything, on either side, and there are benefits, quantifiable and non-quantifiable.

It is important to place such major weapon platform acquisitions in a larger politico-military context and not just as simple procurement issues. The proposed acquisition of 126 multi-role fighter aircraft falls in the same category. These purchases must have a political dimension and to treat them for mere financial audit is simplistic.

(Courtesy The Tribune)

The author is a former Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command.