| President
Barack Obama has invested an inordinate amount of political capital on the deal,
challenging many in the United States political arena and Washington's key allies
like Israel and Saudi Arabia in hopes that a breakthrough on Iran would be his
presidency's international legacy along with his Cuba opening. Obama is
gambling on the nation's war-weariness after the Afghanistan and Iraq wars that
took a total toll of 6,855 casualties and, according to a Harvard researcher,
is costing the nation at least $4 trillion. He presented the nation with a stark
choice: War or Peace. “There really are only two alternatives here,” he
said, “either the issue of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon is resolved diplomatically,
through a negotiation, or it’s resolved through force, through war.” Though
the deal has been denounced by Republicans and some Democrats, and, earlier, the
opponents had taken the unprecedented step of inviting Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu to make their case before Congress, Obama expects to carry
the day. Even if Congress votes against the agreement, Obama reckons the opposition
will not be able to get the two-thirds majority to override his threatened veto.
| Key
elements of the Iranian nuclear deal |
Setting out the modest goals of the Iranian nuclear agreement President Barack
Obama said, “We don’t have diplomatic leverage to eliminate every vestige of a
peaceful nuclearprogramme in Iran. What we do have is the leverage to make sure
they don’t have a weapon. That’s exactly what we’ve done.” In a bid to
reassure his critics, he declared, “This deal is not built on trust; it is built
on verification.” Given the decades of mutual mistrust, he has turned around a
Russian proverb, which President Ronald Reagan proverb liked to quote when dealing
with the Soviet Union on a nuclear treaty: “Trust but verify.” Verification
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of Iran's compliance with itsnon-proliferation
undertakings is at the heart of deal. It rests on limiting to one year the “breakout
time,” the time it would to make a bomb in violation of the agreement. If Tehran
breaks the deal, that would give the rest of the world a year in which to stop
it forcefully. Here is what the IAEA will be looking at: U-235
isotopes needed for bombs are less than one per cent in naturally occurring uranium.
Therefore, it needs to be enriched – or refined – to at least 90 per cent to be
able to make a bomb. While less than five per cent enrichment is considered adequate
for power generation, Iran has been enriching its stockpile to 20 per cent. Centrifuges
are the devices that are used to enrich uranium to bomb grade. Therefore, theNatanz
nuclear plant is to reduce the number of centrifuges to about 5,000 from the current
10,000 to 16,000 and stop enrichment at 3.7 per cent. Iran is to cut down its
stockpile of enriched uranium to 300 kg from the current 10,000 kg. The
Fordow nuclear facility will be converted into a pure research facility and most
of its 3,000 centrifuges are to stop spinning. The other way of making
a bomb utilises plutonium, which is a byproduct of nuclear reaction using uranium,
for example, in power generation. The Arak nuclear reactor could produce plutonium
and, therefore, it is to be sealed. Iran is to redesign the plant so it cannot
produce weapons grade plutonium and it will not construct any such reactors for
the next 15 years. IAEA will be allowed to inspect any suspicious sites
anywhere in Iran, and have more access to its nuclear programme and continuously
monitor the centrifuges and stockpiles for 25 years. Critics point out
that international inspectors have to give 24 days' notice before they can visit
a suspected site, and this could allow Iran to hide its activities. The deal,
supporters say,would be too short a time to conceal violations. A Security
Council resolution proposed by the US on lifting the sanctions would allow any
Security Council permanent member to re-impose sanctions if it believed Iran was
violating the agreement. |
|
Obama's
Iran legacy, if it works according to plan, will not have the impact of Richard
Nixon's opening to China, but it still could mark the end of 36 years of virulent
hostilities. Even if Washington and Tehran don't recapture the closeness of Pahlavi
era, the US will increase its options in the Middle East, a region posing a growing
to the world threat from the Sunni-based Islamic State or ISIL. Right now Washington
is hamstrung by unsure Sunni allies in the region. Already in Iraq, the
US and Iran have been working with different elements on parallel tracks against
ISIL. Obama has been blamed for pulling out US troops from Iraq, although it was
largely in keeping with his predecessor George W Bush's timetable, and for failing
to reach an agreement with Baghdad on stationing some troops beyond the pullout
deadline. These have been mentioned as factors leading to the rise of ISIL. Now,
there is a chance for Obama to redeem himself through the cooperation of Iran,
even if they will not go to the extent of a formal agreement. In the other
ISIL flashpoint to the west of Iraq, there seems to be implacable differences
on Syria. Tehran stands firmly by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whom Washington
considers the irreconcilable foe of peace in that civil war ravaged country. Bridging
this gap even if by face-saving measures would be the true test of a diplomatic
shift. The Iran nuclear issue takes the inevitable colour of a Shia-Sunni
conflict. In the first place, the unspoken impetus for Tehran's nuclear ambitions
was Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and the threat from its Sunni fundamentalists against
Shias. Now Pakistan's stock will rise in Saudi Arabia and other Sunni nations
as hedge as a Sunni-dominated nuclear power ranged against Iran, which they mistrust.
Add to this mix Israel, which has developed an unlikely alliance with Saudi
Arabia. For Israel, the threat comes from fears of the millenarian trends among
some Shia Muslims that could cancel out the insurance that Jerusalem, sacred to
the Muslims, provides and Tehran'svenomous, ant-Semitic rhetoric. But a
more immediate issue for Israel is Tehran's support for the Palestinian Hamas
and the Lebanese Shia Hezbollah. The sanctions against Iran limited its potential
financial and material backing for these organisations and the flow of funds after
sanctions are lifted could boost Tehran's adventurism, directly and through proxies,
Israel fears. On the global diplomatic front, the Iran deal is a break
from the incessant UNSC squabbles that have hobbled it as issues like Ukraine,
Syria, the South China Sea and assorted hotspots in Africa burn. Russia and China
showed they could work intensively with the West. Moscow even earned plaudits
from Obama for its role in facilitating the deal. Russia and Iran share
some common interests in places like Syria, Central Asia and theCaucasus. An unbridled
Tehran could more effectively cooperate with Moscow in these areas. Economically,
Russia, like other oil producers, may be hit by falling oil prices, but the diplomatic
congruence and future arms sales could compensate. For the European Union
and China, the deal opens up business opportunities in a nation with tremendous
economic potential along with lower oil prices. Iran has the fourth largest
known reserves of oil and its current production of 1.1 million barrels could
soar to four million within a year. For most of the developing world, further
reduction in oil prices will be of great help, even as it increases political
and social pressures in some oil-producers. The picture for India is mixed.
It has been paying for Iranian oil imports in rupees while it has been exporting
limited amounts of machinery and chemicals. The bilateral trade is in Iran's favour
and is estimated at about $14 billion, with Indian imports at about $10 billion
and exports at about $4 billion. Now India may be able to buy more oil,
but it will have to pay in rupees and its exports will have to compete with the
rest of the world. With the prospects a sanction going away, India is already
facing Tehran's truculence in oil and gas and railway projects they had agreed
on. The Chabahar port project remains the strategic cornerstone of India's
ambitious engagement with Iran. The port on the Gulf of Oman would give India
access to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan. Chabahar is
also a counterweight to Beijing's Gwadar project in Pakistan that would provide
another sea outlet for China, Afghanistan and Central Asian countries. On
the nuclear non-proliferation front, the Iranian agreement chalks up a small victory
after North Korean blatantly developed nuclear weapons. The world has been
unable to confront Pyongyang diplomatically or militarily because of its mercurial
nature leadership that borders on the insane. For the Iranians themselves,
the deal could ease up their lives and bringing back some normalcy. The bigger
question is how it would play in the dynamics of Iranian politics. Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei approved the deal, but he has since expressed mistrust
of the West in keeping its end of the bargain. That may be rein euphoria and send
a message to the moderates. Would the deal lead to a lessening of the paranoia
among the religious and nationalist elements and in turn strengthen the moderates
and push the present day heirs of the ancient Persian civilisation towards a relatively
liberal modernity? If that were to happen Iran would have truly emerged from the
shadows of international isolation. | 
