| During
my tenure as CAS (Chief of Air Staff) I had a lot of occasions to address the
topic of CDS because there seemed to be a misconception doing the rounds in the
corridors of power that the IAF (Indian Air Force) was the only Service opposed
to the idea of a CDS. This was wrong and I used every opportunity to put forward
the IAF point of view. I thought I had, by and large, succeeded. Recently I came
across a 2013 article which showed a total lack of understanding of what I had
said. I thought it was more than likely that there were more minds which needed
a better explanation and this situation needed to be rectified. The fundamental
questions arising out of the issue of CDS, in my opinion are the following: - Do
we need a CDS?
- What model of CDS do we need?
- Is the present
compromise formula acceptable?
I am sure everyone knows the history
behind the idea of CDS. However, it would be worthwhile recalling relevant facts.
According to Gen Sinha (the erudite Vice Chief of Army Staff, Governor and more),
at Gallipoli during First World War, Gen Sir Ian Hamilton, commanding the Royal
Army was desperate for naval gunfire support. He did not get it because the Admiral
of the Fleet had ordered his warships to clean the boilers. After the First World
War, the British introduced a Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), comprising the
three Service Chiefs. This arrangement was also adopted by other countries. During
the Second World War, the concept of a Supreme Commander in all theatres of war
was evolved. Within a few years after that War, the appointment of Chief of Defence
Staff (CDS) was made at the national level in all countries, except India. Preying
on Nehru’s suspicions of Indian Armed Forces, the civilian bureaucracy by an innocuous
Government note on May 27, 1952 declared the Armed Forces Headquarters as “attached
offices” of the Defence Ministry. In one stroke the bureaucracy divested the Armed
Forces Headquarters of policy-making roles as the ‘Government Manual of Office
Procedures’ decreed that while Ministry of Defence could make policy, their “attached
offices” merely implemented it. In essence the decision-making process was to
have the benefit of independent inputs from the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC),
the Defence Minister’s Committee (Service Chiefs were members of this Committee)
and the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. These in turn signified representation
of the Services, mechanism for the bureaucratic processing, and of course political
control. The Service Chiefs interacted directly with the Cabinet through the Defence
Cabinet Committee. Through the Seventies, Eighties and beyond, the bureaucracy
continued to acquire disproportionate powers vis-àvis the Service Chiefs. Sixty-eight
years after Independence, it is no secret that the politico-military interface
is all but absent in India’s institutional set up. The armed forces are completely
under the day-to-day as well as policy control of the MoD. The desirable politicomilitary
interface is now reduced to weekly, sometimes fortnightly meetings chaired by
the Defence Minister. These meetings are informal, without any agendas or note
taking and have no official status although in theory, the Defence Minister is
deemed to have given policy directions in these meetings! The Kargil Review
Committee (KRC) formed after the 1999 Kargil War forwarded a large number of recommendations
that were deliberated upon by a GoM (Group of Ministers) which, in turn, came
up with a final set of recommendations; major ones being:- - Creation
of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), whose task was to include inter-services
prioritisation of defence plans and improvement in synergy among the three services;
- Creation
of Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS)
- Formation of a tri-service
Andaman and Nicobar Command and a Strategic Forces Command;
- Establishment
of tri-service Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA);
- Creation of The National
Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) for gathering electronic and other technical
intelligence. More than a decade later, many of the decisions with the exception
of the most crucial one – that of the appointment of a CDS – have been implemented.
The CDS envisaged as a single-point military adviser to the Government continues
to remain elusive mainly because there is no political or military consensus and
the bureaucracy is happy to play along.
Do
we need a CDS? Well, what are our reference points? US, UK, France, Australia,
Israel, all have a CDS, though under different names. China and Russia also enjoy
a similar dispensation but their political systems are totally different from
western powers. US with global commitments has independent theatre commands,
such as the Pacific Command, Central Command, etc. Each of these is equipped with
land, air and sea units, as well as bureaucrats and political departments needed
for independent campaigns. The Theatre Commander, a Four-Star General or Admiral,
reports directly to the US President, through the Secretary of Defense. In Washington,
there is a centralised Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), headed by a Five-Star
Chairman. The army, navy, air force and marine corps chiefs plan, train and develop
human resources, leaving the theatre commanders free to handle operations independently.
The smaller British, French, Canadian and Australian militaries place their army,
navy, air force and marine units directly under their respective Four-Star Service
Chiefs. These Service Chiefs Answer to a Five- Star Chief of Defence Staff, who
could be from any Service. The CDS reports to the Minister in charge of defence.
Our requirement for India must be seen through the lens of our strategic perspective,
our threat evaluation, the future environment over our region and future war scenarios
which include an assessment of our capability build up. In the foreseeable future
our main concerns will continue to be China and Pakistan and the two-front scenario.
We are unlikely to develop large scale autonomous expeditionary capabilities.
Our chief requirements would continue to be deterrence against aggression and
safeguarding our territory. Although chances of war are remote, future
wars will be hi-tech, short, with high energy, day/night, with high transparency
of battlefield and heavy rate of consumption of resources. It will involve rapidly
shifting scenarios and use of Remotely Piloted Aircraft will proliferate. I do
not envisage Ops away from mainland. Some Out of Area contingencies, however,
cannot be ruled out. Successful handling of above scenarios requires quick
decisions; a high level of synergy between the Government and military leadership;
a thorough understanding of hi-tech and availability of resources to match the
pace of operations. All these and many other factors lead me to the conclusion
that a CDS in the future will become inevitable, but We have to prepare the ground
for progressing onto a viable CDS regime. So what
do we need to do? To my mind, integration of the three Services with MoD
is the starting point. This is mandatory. If this does not happen we cannot move
forward. Governments over the last six decades have ignored this issue. What this
has done is that ours is the only country in the world where the security apparatus
functions without military participation in decision making. What is worse is
that the benefit of years of operational experience and advice is denied to the
Government. MoD has paid lip service to integration. Nothing has happened on the
ground. The bureaucracy is quite happy because they have the ear of the Ministers
and any failures or delays can conveniently, be attributed to the ‘attached offices’.
Integration cannot happen overnight. I had suggested to the then RM (Raksha
Mantri/Defence Minister) time and again to start small, let us say at Director
level. Let some civil Directors work in Service HQ and some Colonel/equivalent
Service officers work in MoD. We need to start small and when confidence builds,
up the ante. The next major setback is the total absence of any document concerning
National Strategy. Spelling out where we are and where we want to be in 20 years
from now. We not only need to define our National Strategy but publish a white
paper so the other countries are also aware of our thinking. Within the
Services, we must set our egos aside and genuinely embrace jointness.We should
concentrate on jointness in intelligence gathering; training; perspective planning;
and, finally acquisitions, to exploit advantages accruing through economies of
scale. We need to train for jointness. We need to create joint billets right from
the rank of Major or equivalent. We need to modify our promotion policy to ensure
that performance in joint billets has a major effect on promotion. Now
in a democracy all these things take time. Therefore the post of CDS would be
realistically tenable only 8-10 years from now. What
model of CDS do we need? This is the second fundamental question to be
addressed. In US the chain of command runs from the President, through the Secretary
of Defense to the Theatre or Combat Commander. The Service Chiefs support the
Combat Commander by providing facilities like Special Ops, Transport Support,
Strategic Forces etc. The Combat Commander now has a force using all assets required
to employ the Sea/ Air/Land doctrine. The CDS or, in this case the Chairman, Jt
Chiefs of Staffs, is the Principal Military Advisor to the President, the National
Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. He heads the Jt Chiefs of Staff
Committee of which the three Service Chiefs are members along with the marines
component. US has global interests. For Ops far from homeland the policy
of having Theatre commands works efficiently. What this also implies is that each
Theatre has to be by and large selfsufficient. This is costly and only a couple
of countries can afford it. Similarly other models of CDS exist. We have to choose
a model based on our strategic environment and not blindly adopt foreign models.
We must see what improvements our model can provide over the present system. The
guiding principle is that policy, resource allocation and setting of priorities
must be the exclusive domain of the Central Staff. Individual Services will manage
their own Service within the framework centrally set. Something akin to centralised
planning and decentralised execution with a policy oriented CDS or central staff
and management oriented Service staffs. This involves striking a delicate balance
between the central planning staff and the management tasked Service staffs. Ultimately,
however, decisions on the central issues of policy and resources must be taken
by the Central Staffs. Where the advice of individual Services is rejected, it
must be for reasons that are openly stated. There is, therefore, a need to put
these proposals to wider debates and discussions so that those who have to ultimately
make them succeed are indeed convinced of the benefits that are likely to accrue.
There is an unstated agenda in Army minds that being the senior Service
they must get first shot at CDS. Then, there is a continuos discussion on whether
the CDS should sport a Four Star or, a Five Star rank, whether he should be deep
selected or be an outgoing Chief and, what should be his tenure? In my
opinion, the appointment of CDS should be by rotation among the three Services.
I think the selection should be on merit from the serving Chiefs after finishing
a minimum two year tenure. We need to appoint not only the CDS but his Deputy
also who could be a Four Star officer. This will reduce seniority problems and
provide a cushion or overlap during changeover. I think their tenure must be three
to five years to be effective. As far as rank is concerned, it must be a Five
Star appointment. We keep quibbling about four or four plus stars for what reason,
I do not know. If he has to have control over the Chiefs, he must be Five Star.
There is a misplaced fear of a Coup if so much power is vested in one person.
History tells us that while there have been many Coups by Army Chiefs in different
countries there is no case of a CDS effecting a Coup. Now that we have
got the mundane details out of the way let us come to the crux. The appointment
of CDS should have the following characteristics:- - Five Star General/equivalent
at par with Cabinet Secretary
- Seniormost single point advisor to the
PM & the Government through the RM on matters military with the Defence Secretary
handling Defence Production, DRDO,HAL, OFB and inter-ministry issues
-
CDS should be a member of the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) and not an invitee
-
He should look after all Joint Commands like the Strategic and ANC as well as
future Joint Commands like Cyber Command, Space Command, Special Forces Command,
etc
- He should provide the strategic vision and be responsible for strategic,
perspective and contingency plans.
- He should be in-charge of Tri Service
Acquisitions so that we gain by utilising economies of scale and avoid infructuous
duplication.
- The CDS must be viewed as the ‘Head’ of our Armed Forces
providing strategic planning and the vision, while, at the same time each Chief
continues to head his Service as before.
Coming on to the last fundamental
question whether the present compromise formula of having a permanent head of
COSC in lieu of CDS is acceptable. It may be a way out of the muddle but is definitely
not a solution. On ground nothing has changed. There is no integration with MoD.
The Chiefs are not likely to give the poor fellow the time of the day. The bureaucracy
would be laughing all the way at successfully having added another appendage in
the process without affecting their sphere of influence. The main function of
‘a single point of military advice’ would not be achieved. I feel this would just
be an exercise in lip service. It is better to reject it outright than muddle
through for the next 10 years. The Kargil Review Committee ( KRC ) says,
”There is both comfort and danger in clinging to any long established status quo.”
It goes on to say, “While this is true we must be careful not to effect change
for the sake of change,” lest we throw the baby out with the bathwater as the
cliché goes. The idea of CDS needs acceptance by not only the Government but other
political parties also. More than that, the MoD bureaucracy must be made ready
to hand over a large and lucrative part of their power to the Services.
In my opinion the idea of Theatre operations which many feel is a natural fallout
of the CDS system is not viable in our scenario. It will lead to unnecessary duplication
of resources. A cost penalty that the country can ill afford. This proposal stems
from a mistaken belief that personnel of all three Services will perform better
if “Under Command” However, the fact remains that Officers and men need to accept
the importance of functioning in a joint organisation. Lastly, the Importance
of Service Chiefs, their freedom and initiative must be maintained with the CDS
directing policy and the Chiefs managing within those policy guidelines. The
discussions above would bring home to the reader how difficult a transformation
this is. The initial framing of rules must be experimental. They should be finalised
only after sufficient experience is acquired. I would like to state a few home
truths before I end. The whole process of CDS must start with integration of the
Armed Forces with MoD. As can be seen, the time frame is about 8-10 years by which
the Services need to set their house in order and the Government needs to remain
committed to the idea. Management of Armed Forces in future will require
a CDS type of system. Our strategic imperatives will dictate the type of CDS we
need. This would be refined with experience. Whichever model is chosen, I say
go all out without compromises like a permanent chairman of COSC. I would like
to end by quoting from an Australian White Paper on Defence,2000 on how the Armed
Forces should be viewed. It states, “The Armed Forces are not only a service provided
by the Government. They are part of Australia’s national identity.“ Our Armed
forces too have, over the last seven decades, more than proved that they are a
part of the national identity and not just a service.
– Editors’ Note: The views expressed by the author are personal and do not necessarily
reflect the thinking of the journal/individual editors. | 
