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about the past 300 years or so, foreign powers have dominated the Indian Ocean.
Although the Ocean carries the ‘Indian’ name, India has never really put its stamp
on it. The changing geo-political scenario of the last few decades has created
an opportunity for India to enter the scene, without creating a fear of India’s
hegemony. One presumes that it was with this in mind that the Prime Minister made
his Indian Ocean island-hopping visits in March 2015. THE
GEO-POLITICS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN USA, in collaboration with Britain, wished
to control the sea-lanes passing through the Indian Ocean and other seas, leading
to super-power rivalry. The allies also raised the bogey of the spread of communism
through this area. In the 1970s, the British began pulling out of the Indian Ocean;
the US, to gain control over the Afro-Asian countries in their imperialistic zeal,
and to control the sea-lanes passing through it, began moving in, the primary
idea being to keep out the USSR. India, too, tried to fill the vacuum, but did
not have the wherewithal to step in; its grandiose plan of building a 200-ship
navy did not have the requisite finances to afford the plan. India also tried
to mobilise the littorals but was ignored, as it did not have the required influence
in the international community. The US went on to build a military base in Diego
Garcia in 1973, much against the regional and world opinion, citing safety for
its oil lines from the West Asian countries; it, thus, became the “Big Daddy”
of the region. The Indian Ocean continued to be ‘Indian’, but only in name. The
end of the Cold War heralded a new era, and the dissipation of the fear of a communist
giant. The trade and economic connectivity through the Indian Ocean, well understood
for years, came to the fore. Oil from the Persian Gulf States to China, Japan,
and India, became their primary source of energy; a new economic interdependence
developed in manufactured goods, refinery capacity, food security, and labour
migration. The uncertainties about American power and influence began to raise
questions about the new geopolitical equations in the Indian Ocean. Some
nations of the region while worrying about the declining American influence, still
consider it as the only uniquely competent player with a capability of power projection,
more comprehensive than any other nation, including China. On the other hand,
there are those who are pleased at the image of a more restrained America, withdrawing
its forces from war zones, and unwilling to step in to resolve regional conflicts;
the right amount of American power, presence, and influence, is hard to calibrate.
Neither is the confident assertiveness of the Bush era visible, nor does the introspective
modesty of the Obama era appear quite right. Few see China as having the
capacity to be a major Indian Ocean power yet. Chinese rhetoric, emphasising its
limited capacity and focus on its own economic development, as the determinant
of its external relationships, reassures such nations. Today, commercial interests
seem to drive China’s push in its shipbuilding and port construction in and around
the Indian Ocean, although it is reasonable to assume that the large investments
being made by it could later evolve or be adapted for military purposes, as a
contribution towards global problem-solving, or protection of own business-related
interests, or hegemonic designs. The handling of Somali pirates is one such example,
which gave the Chinese Navy the desired legitimacy for its presence in the Indian
Ocean. Since 2008, 19 Chinese naval task forces have moved in and out of the area;
since 2014, intelligence-gathering ships and submarines have been making regular
forays into the Indian Ocean, none having to do anything with anti-piracy operations!
The diminishing US presence by the transfer of its ships to the Pacific
region, due to a change in its strategic interests, had already given rise to
the Somali piracy; India and the other navies had then to combine to beat back
the pirates. India, while trying to promote a friendly relationship with all the
littorals, accepted that its past passivity could not work under the developing
scenario, especially with the increasing presence of the Chinese navy in the Indian
Ocean. In this backdrop, India stepped forth to establish a bridge to the
island States of the region, some of which, with other littorals, were once doubtful
of India’s staying power. ‘Indian Ocean Diplomacy’ is not a term that is frequently
used in Indian foreign policy, despite the region being a part of India’s ‘maritime
backyard’. The visits of the Prime Minister to the area need to be seen in this
light. VISITS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN STATES The
Indian foreign policy specialists seemed to have been fixated with the ‘Look East’
policy, advocated by the previous regimes. The Prime Minister seems to have corrected
this fixation from the very first day itself, by inviting the heads of Nations
of the SAARC, to his swearingin ceremony. As an acknowledgement of their strategic
importance for stability in the Indian Ocean, the Prime Minister visited Australia
and Fiji in November 2014, followed by the visits to the Seychelles, Mauritius,
and Sri Lanka. Many would recollect the exodus of about 3,500 families from Fiji,
quite some years ago; what many would not know or remember that on their exit,
an equal number of Chinese business families had quietly moved in! Seychelles.
Apart from the presence of people of Indian origin, a fact known to many,
India is also the unofficial security provider to the island nation of Seychelles
since the 1980s. Away from the public glare, the two nations have shared strong
military cooperation over the last three decades. In June 1986, India had despatched
a naval destroyer to Victoria for Operation ‘Flowers are Blooming’, and later
an Air India aircraft, as a show of strength to thwart two coup attempts against
the then president France-Albert René. India trains the island’s security forces,
and defence treaties signed in 2003 and 2010, have further cemented the ties.
India gifted a patrol ship to Seychelles in 2014, to augment maritime surveillance
and patrolling capabilities in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); three frontline
Indian Navy ships then visited the nation, as a show of friendship. During the
recent visit, Seychelles has leased an entire island, the ‘Assumption Island’,
for development of security infrastructure; India would also be establishing surveillance
capabilities across eight islets of Seychelles, thus bringing out in the open
the existing security ties. The visit of the Prime Minister, the first by an Indian
leader in 34 years, was not just to give an impetus to the security ties, but
also to cement economic relations. As would any small country, Seychelles as an
island nation, has played one major power against another, to get the best from
all; in recent times, it has played the China card against India, which India
accepts as a move only to attract attention. India continues to remain its primary
security partner, a position endorsed by USA, UK, and France – the historic defenders
of Seychelles. Mauritius. This island nation
is also known as the region’s “Little India”, not just for security and economic
dependence, but also for the fact that about 70 per cent of Mauritius’ population
is of Indian origin. India has played a pivotal role in the nations’ politics
to ensure that whichever of the major domestic political parties comes to power,
it remains aligned to Indian interests. During the recent visit in March 2015,
apart from the agreements for economic cooperation and trade, an important security-oriented
agreement was also reached, that of improvement of air and sea transportation
facilities at the two islands of Agalega, due north of the main island of Mauritius.
This MoU would help set up upgraded infrastructure for improving sea and air connectivity
at the outer islands of Mauritius, to not only improve the living conditions of
the local inhabitants, but also enhance capabilities of the Mauritian security
forces, and establish a permanent Indian presence. Indian naval vessels,
along with the Mauritian National Coast Guard, regularly patrol the vast EEZ of
Mauritius to deter piracy and illegal fishing activities. To augment the capabilities
of the Coast Guard, an Indian-built offshore patrol boat, the ‘Barracuda’ was
commissioned during the visit. The Mauritian National Security Advisor is always
an ex-Indian intelligence officer, and its Coast Guard and Air Wing are, almost
wholly, manned by deputed Indian personnel, are further examples of India’s close
involvement in the national security affairs of Mauritius. It would be safe to
say that apart from Bhutan, no other nation has so willingly subordinated its
external and security policy to India; it, however, also means an additional responsibility
for India. Sri Lanka. The visit of the
Prime Minister of India to Sri Lanka was the first of any Prime Minister in 28
years, another irony of the Indian foreign policy! Sri Lanka is India’s largest
trading partner from amongst the SAARC nations. Trade with Sri Lanka has grown
four times, increasing from $658 million to $2,719 million in the decade ending
2009; but during this time, the country looked for investments from China as well!
Sri Lanka and India also have long-standing defence agreements, with six
Coastal Surveillance Radars presently functioning there; this arrangement helps
the country to identify ship traffic sailing past the island nation, besides augmenting
the Indian monitoring capabilities established in our Southern parts. As a forerunner
to the Prime Minister’s visit, the Sri Lankan President had visited India in February
2015, when the ties moved to a new high, with the inking of a civil nuclear pact,
besides deciding to expand defence and security cooperation. The visit to Sri
Lanka by the Indian Prime Minister, in March 2015 raised the strategic bar further
for both the countries. Maldives. Prime
Minister Modi was to visit Maldives as well in March 2015, but decided against
it, due to the unstable political conditions existing in that country at that
time. Notwithstanding the cancellation of the visit, the strategic importance
of Maldives to India is not just because of its location in the Indian Ocean,
but also due to the entry of radical fundamentalists in that string of islands.
The islands have a history of turbulent politics, which have troubled India;
the dramatic military intervention in 1988, to foil a coup, is probably the best
example of the importance of an India- friendly government in Maldives. The
islands sit astride three of the important sea-lanes of communication, through
which pass India’s most of the trade and oil requirements. Apart from its location,
the recruiters of jihadi fundamentalism from Taliban, and Pakistan, have successfully
influenced students from Maldives, a fact accepted and mentioned in the Annual
Ministry of Defence Report, as far back as in 2000; recent news indicates some
youth from the Maldives joining the ranks of the IS. China has been providing
aid with an attempt to become a big player in that country; luckily, it has not
succeeded in the security sector. Without appearing as a ‘Big Brother’, Indian
diplomacy has had to hard sell the fact to Maldives that, without fear of Indian
hegemony, the national security of both nations is intertwined; this was precisely
the reason that the Minister of External Affairs visited Maldives in October 2015.
India was to set up a string of Coastal Radars in the Maldives, but this will
probably now have to wait. In the interim, Indian naval vessels continue to participate
in exercises with the Maldivian National Defence Force, and carry out joint surveillance
and anti-piracy missions in the Maldives EEZ. This is in addition to the constant
training of personnel of the Maldivian National Defence Force by India. CONCLUDING
THOUGHTS India accepts the genuine Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean,
to protect its economic growth; 40 per cent of China’s energy imports pass through
the choke point of Malacca Strait, off the Singapore coast. A blockade in that
area would bring the Chinese economy to its knees! Attempts to hold talks with
China for a cooperative solution have not brought forth desired results. Hence,
India’s response with the core policy of bringing the island nations into a diplomatic,
political, and security hug. Though the policy has existed for a few decades,
its vigorous implementation now, has the backing of a strong economy. The
PM’s visits have helped tie some loose strands in India’s island diplomacy. And
dispel doubts of the staying power of the Indian economy! It would be best to
establish multilateral institutions across the Indian Ocean nations that have
India in their heart. The Prime Minister has made a beginning by speaking of a
“collective cooperative” vision for the region, spreading the message that India
now has the military capability and economic capacity to support them. Any
small nation, in the close vicinity of a larger power, would constantly fear of
colonialist designs that may emerge at some time or the other. India’s proposal
has a different approach altogether. With an assurance to the island nations of,
not ever, harbouring any imperialistic designs towards them, it has instead invoked
the cultural-centric relations with them. India has agreed to provide defence
against any security challenges arising from extra-regional powers and non-state
actors, such as pirates and extremists, through a distinctive image of a collective
umbrella. The Prime Minister has infused freshness into the relations with
Seychelles, Mauritius, and Sri Lanka. It is now for the keepers of the foreign
policy to follow up and indicate to the world the emergence of India as a leader
in its own extended maritime backyard. | |
