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The images of field guns firing in Kargil in
1999 with a devastating effect at the target end
are still afresh in the mind of the Indian public.
That was also the time when India was recovering
from the economic crisis of the early 1990s when
the foreign exchange reserves had dwindled to
dangerous lows to even think of acquiring defence
equipment through imports. The Kargil crisis compelled
the politico-military establishment to reassess
the country’s defence and security policies, not
just to replace the Soviet vintage equipment with
the Armed Forces but in terms of their modernization.
In the subsequent years as part of its overall
modernization effort, a Field Artillery Rationalisation
Plan was introduced; the same also formed basis
for the Artillery modernization plans.
Consequent to the experience in Operation Parakaram,
the Indian army revised its doctrine in 2004 to
respond to the realities of a tough neighbourhood.
As a result, a Cold Start doctrine was articulated
which had several premises. Evidently, a doctrine
draws from experiences of previous wars and can
be aspirational as it defines the objectives that
should be chosen for the future and the operational
concepts to be followed to attain goals. In this
mode, a doctrine drives the nature of organization,
force structure and training.
The Cold Start doctrine enunciated by the Indian
Army rests on rapid mobilization, concentration
and launch of operations in a seamless continuum.
The other planks of the doctrine are:
- Multiple thrusts with divisional sized integrated
battle groups.
- Broad front, shallow depth, limited objectives.
- Pivot corps offensives supplemented with
available Integrated Battle Groups from Strike
Corps resources.
- Strike reserve largely uncommitted.
- Aims at attrition and capture of territory.
- Cognizant of possible nuclear thresholds.
- All weather, day night operations; air drops
and heliborne operations; IW and EW; massed
firepower (‘100 guns’ concept); operational
fires.
Massing of accurate and heavy volume of firepower,
coordinated with combined arms operations including
the air support would be a necessary condition
for achieving the objectives of a Cold Start doctrine
in real-time. The Artillery doctrine no doubt
will flow out of the conceptual and doctrinal
issues for combined arms operations emanating
from the Cold Start precepts.
Lack of adequate artillery firepower would definitely
restrict the freedom and movement of own forces
whereas enhanced enemy artillery fire power will
also add to difficulties of own forces’ manoeuvre.
The Cold Start doctrine requires a massive artillery
support ab initio to neutralise the enemy defences
in the shortest possible time without giving him
much reaction time.
Further, the India Army Chief has recently talked
about the changing geo-political and strategic
environment and the need to be prepared for a
range of security threats and challenges including
the possibilities of a need to deal with two fronts.
He also reflected upon the Out of Area Contingencies
which may necessitate employment of forces. Therefore
the gaping voids in our field artillery need to
be filled up in a hurry to meet the likely threats
to the defence of the realm.
The artillery rationalization plan’s key objective
was to standardize the equipment profile from
a multitude of caliber of guns to a single caliber.
There are advantages to be gained in terms of
streamlined logistics, easy maintenance and repairs
including standardization of ammunition.
While, this plan was outlined at the turn of
the century with ambitious goal of implementing
it in three to four plan periods of Five Year
Defence Plans, no progress could be made due to
several contextual factors. The major factor being
the ghost of Bofors (payoff allegations in their
mid-1980s deal) exacerbated further by allegations
of corruption in some of the subsequent potential
artillery acquisition deals.
However, as a first step towards modernization
of field artillery almost over a decade after
enunciation of FARP, there is silver lining on
the cloud. Finally, the government has decided
to buy 145 M777 ultralight howitzers from the
US-based entity of the BAE Systems through the
government-to-government Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) route. The FMS route avoids all the ills
and impediments associated with India’s Defence
Procurement Procedure which has been continually
revised but has not delivered especially on the
artillery procurement.
A Fast Track Procedure is also part of the DPP
but that has also not helped meet India’s burgeoning
defence acquisition needs.
An indication that the above deal of 145 light
Howitzers may be clinched was a notification by
the Pentagon to the US Congress in the second
half of January 2010 of a possible sale of 145
state-of-the-art lightweight towed Howitzers to
India.
The Defence Security Cooperation Agency rationalized
to the Congress, “India intends to use the howitzers
to modernise its armed forces and enhance its
ability to operate in hazardous conditions. The
howitzers will assist the Indian Army to develop
and enhance standardisation and to improve interoperability
with US Soldiers and Marines who use the M777
as their primary means of indirect fire. India
will have no difficulty in absorbing these weapons
into its armed forces.”
That it also makes a good commercial sense and
an important breakthrough in the Indian defence
bazaar can not be mentioned in the solemn note
to the Congress.
There are reports however, on another level,
that the deal may not come through as a result
of the recent strategic side-lining of India in
the London Conference on the Afghanistan imbroglio.
There are unconfirmed reports that the Indian
policy establishment is considering as to what
strategic leverages India has to ensure its meaningful
role in unfolding scenarios in Afghanistan where
the dominant discourse is being dictated by the
US, notably the Pentagon.
Some years back, before the Indo- US defence
Framework Agreement was signed in 2005 and the
Ministry of Defence had drawn out ambitious defence
acquisition plans, a retiring Defence Secretary
had remarked that defence purchases from abroad
should be used a strategic leverages in consonance
with our policy objectives. If such recourse is
adopted it would further delay the process of
procurement.
But then this is not the end of the massive requirements
of Indian field artillery for either ultra light
howitzers or for that matter other type of guns.
There are four other types of 155 mm guns which
are to be acquired as part of the long-term artillery
modernization plans.
While the acquisition of 145 Howitzers would
be sufficient only to equip seven artillery regiments
after catering for General staff reserves and
would fill existing voids or provide replacements
for mountain artillery units to be converted to
155 mm caliber as part of FARP, additional requirements
have also arisen because of the governments decision
to raise two mountain divisions and a fourth artillery
division to support operations in the mountainous
areas.
This would translate into a requirement of ultra
light howitzers for four mountain artillery brigades
which would mean acquisition of additional 290
pieces that would have to be spread over 12th,
13th and 14th Five Year Defence Plans.
As part of the first phase of FARP, besides the
145 pieces, a requirement of 158 Towed and wheeled
guns, 100 tracked guns to support the mechanized
formations and 180 wheeled guns with armour protection
has been spelt out. Hopefully, these guns would
be acquired in the current 11th Five Year Plan
(2007-2012). Last year, the Defence Acquisition
Council had included a fifth category classified
as Mounted Gun Systems.
These howitzers, mounted on wheeled chassis,
would have a shoot and scoot capability with the
crew remaining mounted on the vehicle.
Looking at the overall requirements the estimates
of the number of guns to be inducted to complete
the rationalization plan range from 2700 to 3600
guns in the long term perspective of 15 to 20
years costing between Rs 22,000 crores to Rs 30,000
crores.
These demands are based on the total number of
artillery regiments which are 200 or so, and the
additional artillery units planned to be raised.
Such mammoth requirements also predicate that
India has to indigenize the production of 155
mm guns as it can remain an importer if it has
any pretensions of becoming a major power.
Defence Minister A K Antony though has already
stated that the policy now was to acquire every
important system with Transfer of Technology (ToT).
Indian artillery immediately needs 400 towed
155 mm guns as no such guns have been acquired
since the Bofors were inducted in 1987. Induction
of these guns would be followed by indigenous
production of 1580 guns of this type.
The acquisition process was suspended after dealings
with Singapore’s ST Kinetics (and six other companies)
were put on hold due to allegations of corruption
involving Ordnance Factories Board (OFB)’s top
executive. That in fact led to a single vendor
situation, and that is best avoided, according
to the procurement manual.
The results of the investigations (by India’s
Central Bureau of Investigation, or CBI) are not
known but till the companies involved are not
cleared of the allegations or suspicions, no contracts
would be signed by them. However, pending the
completion of the process, the procedural system
has okayed that the trials of equipment offered
by these companies could go on so as not to cause
further delay. A deal could and would be signed
only after these companies are cleared of any
charges of wrong-doing.
Accordingly, the government has approved the
trials of the Towed guns from SK Kinetics and
BAE Systems with the caveat that trials are subject
to clearance of allegations of corruption (in
the case of SK Kinetics). Indian Army Chief Gen
Deepak Kapoor (a gunner himself) had admitted
the development to be of a particular concern
as the Army has not been able to purchase a single
gun in the last 23 years. Earlier Denel of South
Africa was blacklisted on similar charges which
led to the current re-tendering process.
The second category is of Tracked guns mounted
on tank chassis for supporting the mechanized
formations for five artillery regiments to be
acquired to the extent of 100 155mm/52 caliber
guns to replace the existing 130mm Catapult and
105 mm Abbot Guns.
There is the third category of wheeled 155 mm
guns mounted on a six-wheeled vehicle with armour
protection to the extent of 180 (as mentioned
earlier). The fourth category of ultralight howitzers
has already been discussed above.
And the last and the fifth category is the mounted
gun system, The artillery modernization includes
off-the-shelf purchase of 200 155mm/52-calibre
mounted gun systems to be followed by indigenous
manufacture of another 614 such howitzers under
transfer of technology. The 17-tonne motorized
howitzers will arm 40 regiments. A rough glance
would suggest that the overall requirement would
easily surpass a figure of 3000 guns.
Concerned about fast depleting stocks including
war wastage reserves of field artillery, the Army
Headquarters has mooted a proposal for the induction
of 80-100 pieces of 130 mm medium guns from old
stocks lying with former Soviet Republics, as
a desperate last resort, to have something at
least ASAP.
Though of World War II vintage, the 130 mm gun
was imported and inducted into the Indian artillery
in the 19060s. It is a rugged and a reliable gun
which has seen action in all the terrains as obtaining
in India including the Sia Chen Glacier base,
high altitude areas and deserts.
However, it lacks the sophistication and mobility
of the modern artillery guns, and has a limited
range of the types of ammunitions it can fire.
The Army headquarters is being forced to adopt
such a measure for earliest making up of critical
deficiencies and building already depleted war
wastage stocks. It needs to be underscored that
except for upgradation of a limited number of
130 mm guns to 155mm by Soltam of Israel, a project
that received mixed reviews, the Indian army has
not inducted or upgraded an artillery gun for
nearly three decades.
In fact, OFB tried to sell the upgunned 130mm
to the Gulf countries, but there was no interest
in an old system here.
With indigenous production at standstill, in
the Artillery faces a real precarious situation
and hence this desperate and some say counterproductive
measure. It is learned that the issue was discussed
in recent Defence Acquisition Council meeting
with final decision still pending.
Enunciation of the Cold Start doctrine could
not have served its purpose of strategic communication
to our potential adversaries unless the voids
in fire power are made up in double quick time.
The acquisition decisions on procurement of 155
mm 52 caliber towed howitzers, SP tracked and
wheeled guns, and mounted gun systems as also
ultralight howitzers must be taken on priority
for the Artillery to play its role in a future
war imposed on India.
The writer is a former Commander in Chief of the Estern Naval Command.
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